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Abstract
Scapegoating is a source of ine¢ ciency in organizations. This is a commonly
held view. But despite its commonality and its use as a justi￿cation for reforms
designed to reduce scapegoating, no formal model has been developed to explain
why and when this is the case.
We propose an explanation by focusing on how superiors make decisions
inside an organization when they only care about reputation. Consider delega-
tion choices, for example. The hiring of e¢ cient workers may be a good idea
if successful production is the only way to build reputation. But if successful
scapegoating also increases reputation, superiors will tend to hire less e¢ cient
workers since they are easier to blame if something goes wrong.
In this context, scapegoating is a "nested" activity that only occurs after bad
outcomes. Its results do not directly a⁄ect the welfare of society but indirectly
a⁄ect the decisions governing the probability of success in production.
We also examine "nested" activities following good outcomes and show how
these can increase e¢ ciency without relying on costly incentives.
This "nested reputation" game also predicts that in good times superiors
tend to hire more e¢ cient workers than in bad times, a feature we call "Machi-
avellian E⁄ect".
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11 Introduction
A quick review of newspapers in many countries shows that people condemn
scapegoating behavior. This attitude is not only due to the unfairness scape-
goating represents, but also to its negative e⁄ects on e¢ ciency and performance
in organizations.
It is typically believed that a superior￿ s impunity to blame subordinates plays
a big role in the explanation of ine¢ ciencies in both public and private sectors.
The common argument is that scapegoating leads to poor performance because
superiors think "Why exert high e⁄orts if I can always blame an employee in
case things go wrong?".
In fact, this general idea has been widely mentioned in recent reforms de-
signed to change accountability relations in the public sector. For example, the
assignment of more responsibility to superiors has been a main objective of re-
forms made by OECD countries over the past decade. "Better accountability, it
is often suggested, is both an end in itself (representing democratic values) and
a means towards the development of more e¢ cient and e⁄ective organizations"
(Martin, 1997).
Speci￿c cases are the "Next Steps" and the "Outcome-Output" programs of
the UK and New Zealand respectively, where the goal is to generate "(mecha-
nisms of) defense available to bureaucrats in danger of becoming political scape-
goats" (Polidano, 1999).
Another criticism to scapegoating in public service comes from the Rome
Conference for an International Criminal Court. It was stated, for example,
that "(given a subordinate crime), civilian superiors are not subjected to the
"should have known" standard of their military counterparts"1.
But even when these movements have proposed the reduction of superior￿ s
scapegoating to improve e¢ ciency, no model has been developed so far to formal-
ize this seemingly well-accepted idea. The unique, but yet informal, explanation
o⁄ered to justify the reforms is that superiors exert less e⁄ort when covered by
their employees if something fails. But this explanation is criticized by arguing
that under scapegoating employees may also want to increase e⁄orts, making
the ￿nal results unclear.
To understand the consequences of scapegoating on e¢ ciency, we abstracts
any e⁄ort consideration from this paper and focus only on delegation decisions
made by reputation-concerned superiors.
The two forces almost exclusively used to explain delegation decisions are
specialization (because of information and skills restrictions to superiors) and
scale (because of the impossibility of superiors to e⁄ectively oversee all di⁄erent
parts of the production process). But another consideration, almost always
forgotten by the economic literature, is the reputation concerns of those who
make the decisions (Bendor et al. (2001)).
1Article 25 of the Responsibility of Commanders and Superiors Statute
2In fact, reputation motifs of delegation were carefully discussed a long time
ago by Machiavelli in his famous book "The Prince". One of his dictums says,
"Princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures and keep
in their own hands the distribution of favours". Machiavelli￿ s argument was that
princes should delegate when the probability of having a good outcome is low
and work by themselves if it is high. In this way princes would be able to blame
others if something goes wrong, maintaining their reputation and the love of
the kingdom￿ s people.
More recently, Alesina and Tabellini (2005) formally modeled this pattern.
They show that politicians tend to retain under their control policy tools that
are useful for building winning coalitions or generating campaign contributions.
Contrarily, they tend to delegate tasks that expose them to risk, in order to
use bureaucrats as scapegoats or "risk shields" if something goes wrong. The
authors use as examples European national politicians who publicly blame bu-
reaucrats in front of the European Commission and big bureaucracies (such as
the IMF) that sometimes are used as international scapegoats.2
With these exceptions in mind, delegation and reputation models have gen-
erally been divorced in the literature, which is surprising considering the exis-
tence of outstanding studies that provide formal models for conceptualizing and
understanding reputation rigorously. Starting with Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), important contributions were Fudenberg and
Levine (1989 and 1992), Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Cripps, Mailath
and Samuelson (2004).
To forget reputation when explaining delegation is not a trivial omission
since, depending on how reputation is built, it may be corrosive to optimal del-
egation choices. For example, if a good reputation is not only obtained from
being successful at producing but also from being successful at blaming, superi-
ors may prefer to hire ine¢ cient workers who are easier to blame rather than hire
e¢ cient workers who are better to produce. In this case, scapegoating can be
used strategically by superiors who care about reputation, a⁄ecting delegation
decisions and e¢ ciency results.
Despite the recognition of strategic reasons for scapegoating in the socialpsy-
chology literature, (Bell & Tetlock, 1989; Douglas, 1995), formal economic stud-
ies of this behavior are new and sparse. Dezso (2004) analyzes the conditions
under which random ￿ring of potential innocents (scapegoats) is a reaction to
failures in order to maintain reputation. He focuses in ￿ring and not in hir-
ing, without being able to analyze the impact on e¢ ciency. Segendor⁄ (2000)
analyzes the possible hiring of scapegoats using a signalling game, without an-
alyzing e¢ ciency consequences either. Winter (2001) ￿nds that, under some
circumstances, in order to provide better incentives to top levels in an orga-
nization, it may be optimal for middle levels to bear more responsibility, an
aspect he labels "scapegoating". He did not consider reputation e⁄ects nor
hiring decisions though.
Empirical studies about scapegoating are even less common. An exception is
2See also Alesina and Tabellini (2004)
3Huson et al. (2004) who developed a moral hazard-driven scapegoat hypothesis
based on agency models to study the impact of managerial succession on ￿rm
performance.
In this paper, we o⁄er a novel interpretation of scapegoating as a non-
productive activity that occurs only after failures and may be used by reputation-
concerned superiors to signal their competence. To work with this idea we ex-
tend the reputation environment developed by Mailath and Samuelson (2001)3
introducing both delegation and scapegoating.
Superiors will be either competents or inepts. While competents have the
possibility of hiring both e¢ cient (expert) and ine¢ cient (nonexpert) workers,
inepts can only work with ine¢ cient ones. When deciding whether or not to
hire an expert, competents compare the higher probability of obtaining good
results and gaining reputation to the higher wages they have to pay
In the same way that production outcomes are useful elements for inferring
a superior￿ s competence, scapegoating is introduced as an additional alternative
superiors can use to signal their capability. If blaming is a clearer way to signal
competence than production, superiors will prefer to make decisions that exploit
blaming, not caring if only production matters to society. In this way superiors
will make delegation decisions not only thinking on production but also on
potential scapegoating.
Hence, conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium with and without scapegoating
are compared, concluding that in the former case it is more di¢ cult, or even
impossible, to achieve e¢ ciency as an equilibrium.
The main force driving this result is that hiring experts becomes less at-
tractive when scapegoating is a possibility. First, scapegoating avoids a big
decrease in reputation after a failure, reducing the expected reputation gains
from working with e¢ cient employees. Second, hiring experts hinders the use
of scapegoating to maintain reputation after a failure since it is harder to blame
experts than nonexperts, reducing the expected reputation losses from working
with ine¢ cient employees.
But in order scapegoating really a⁄ects hiring decisions, competents must
have both better production possibilities and better blaming capabilities. If this
is the case, they will prefer to hire nonexperts in situations where, without the
opportunity to abdicate responsibility, would have preferred to hire experts.
Even when focusing on how scapegoating, an activity after failures, a⁄ects
e¢ ciency, we also extend the logic to study activities that are better at building
reputation as well, but that only occur after successes. Many examples, from
areas so diverse as sports and universities, are discussed in the paper.
In fact, we will propose to increase the possibilities for achieving e¢ ciency
by introducing unproductive stages after successes in nested reputation games,
exploiting reputation forces in the right direction without requiring monetary
resources or costly incentives.
3See also this paper for a nice discussion about similarities and di⁄erences with more
standard reputation models from Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992).
4Finally, we will show also that considering nested reputation games it is
possible to recover a "Machiavellian E⁄ect". Our version of his dictum will be
"Superiors tend to hire nonexperts in bad times and experts in good times".
To my knowledge, nested reputation models do not exist, constituting this
work an initial e⁄ort to understand how the results in a standard reputation
game change when introducing "nested" activities. Even when this paper shares
some features with the literature on "reputation spillover,￿the logic is not the
same4. Spillover refers to the impact of reputation in one aspect on the rep-
utation in another aspect, hence dealing with di⁄erent and multiple types of
reputation. Here reputation is based on a single aspect but it is constructed
through several nested stages and steps.
The next section presents the basic model of reputation with delegation and
scapegoating, being an special application of a "nested reputation" environment.
Section 3 analyzes the conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium, showing how and
when scapegoating leads to ine¢ ciency and to "Machiavellian E⁄ects". Section
4 proposes a way to induce e¢ ciency by exploiting reputation concerns, without
relying on the use of costly incentives. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Description
This model extends Mailath and Samuelson (2001) by introducing scapegoating
as a nested activity and delegation.
Assume a superior (who can be a country president, a minister, the owner
of a ￿rm or a CEO) who is responsible for providing a service, selling a good
or in general achieving a target that generates utility to "consumers" (who can
also be citizens, stockholders, or even upper-level superiors in the hierarchy).
Each period the superior has to make an unobservable delegation decision
to achieve the target. He can be one of two possible types, Competent (C) or
Inept (I). Competents have two possible choices: To hire experts (DE), paying
a wage wE; or to hire nonexperts (DN), paying wN < wE. Inepts can only
delegate to nonexperts because no expert would like to work with them. Before
deciding, the superior observes the state of the nature, good (G) or bad (B),
which a⁄ects the probability of success in achieving the target.
After the decision is made, production happens and a non-deterministic
output, which can be good (g) or bad (b), is obtained. When competents hire
experts the probability of a good result in good times is (1 ￿ ￿) > 1
2 and in
bad times ￿ < 1
2. Hiring nonexperts allows them to obtain good results with
a probability (1 ￿ ￿) in good times and ￿ in bad times (where ￿ > ￿ )5. An
4See a discussion on Cole and Kehoe (1996).
5The assumption of symmetry in probabilities does not change the main conclusions and
allows the use of just two parameters (￿ and ￿) instead of four, eliminating awkward expres-
sions.
5important assumption is that (￿ ￿ ￿) > (wE ￿ wN) > 0, which means it is
e¢ cient for society that competents always hire experts, both in good and bad
times. It basically says that, if "consumers" knew agents￿delegation decisions,
they would be willing to pay a premium for competents to always hire experts.
When the outcome is ￿nally observed and the result is a failure, the superior
has to make a report about its causes, deciding the intensity and amount of
evidence to be presented against workers (scapegoating). This is a nested second
stage in the game that occurs only after failures and not after successes. Once
the report is done, a non-deterministic decision about the credibility of the
evidence is taken, by a "court" for example, that concludes whether the employee
(ec) or the superior (sc) is considered the culprit of the failure.
Deciding the intensity of the blaming and the amount of evidence displayed,
superiors choose directly the probability of the "court" blaming the worker6.
For example, inepts decide a probability y the "court" pronounces against sub-
ordinates such that y 2 [0;y] where y ￿ 1. This means there can be a maximum
capacity to successfully blame workers, or which is the same, maximum blaming
intensities do not necessarily assure the "court" deciding against subordinates.
When competents choose a probability the "court" decides in his favor, they
know if the blamed employee is an expert or a nonexpert. If competents worked
with experts, they decide a probability x and if they worked with nonexperts
they may choose a di⁄erent one, z. These probabilities will be such that x 2
[0;x] and z 2 [0;z] where x ￿ z ￿ 1.
The maximum probabilities of successful blaming in all cases (x, y and z)
are exogenous parameters known by everybody in the economy and basically
describe blaming capabilities under maximum blaming intensities.
Finally, at the end of the period, the superior may be replaced by another
superior with a ￿xed probability ￿: The substitute will be competent with a
probability ￿ 2 (0;1) 7.
"Consumers" (continuum of identical persons of unit mass such that no
single individual can a⁄ect the future play of the game) repeatedly receive the
output generated under superior￿ s commands (e.g, consumers purchase a good,
citizens receive a service and stockholders obtain dividends). This generates two
possible utility levels in each period, 1 if the result is a good outcome (u(g) = 1)
and 0 if it is a bad outcome (u(b) = 0). "Consumers" do not get any utility
from scapegoating results.
Even when "consumers" know the probability of being in a good state is
Pr(G) = ￿, they are not able to see if the economy is in good or bad times nor if
the superior hired experts or nonexperts. "Consumers" can only see the results
from production activities (success or failure) and from blaming activities after
failures (superior or employee considered culprit).
6A nil blaming intensity and no evidence, for example, makes it impossible for the "court"
to decide against the worker. Increasing blaming e⁄orts also increases the probability the
"court" pronounces against employees.
7This assumption is needed to sustain an e¢ cient equilibrium in the long run, as discussed
in Mailath and Samuelson (2001) and Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson (2004).
6From this information they update the probability that the superior is com-
petent, Pr(C) = ￿, (i.e. his or her reputation). This is of the utmost importance
to superiors since we assume each "consumer" has to buy the good or service
before production takes place, hence paying the expected utility and not the
real utility it delivers.
The greater the reputation (probability of the superior being competent),
the greater the probability assigned by "consumers" to obtain good outcomes
and the more payments they will be willing to make for the good or service. This
is the reason superiors are so concerned about reputation while "consumers" are
only concerned about the utility derived from production.
2.2 Timing
The timing of the model is:
1) The superior receives the payment for period t, before the production
takes place, which only depends on his reputation and not on his period t0s true
type, delegation decision or real production result.
2) The superior observes ￿, wE, wN and the environment state (G or B).
Competents decide between hire experts or nonexperts. Inepts can only hire
nonexperts. "Consumers" do not observe this decision, nor whether there are
good or bad times.
3) Output is produced and both "consumers" and the superior observe the
true utility given by a good (g) or bad (b) outcome (1 or 0 respectively). All
"consumers" receive the same realization of utility outcome, which is public.
4) The superior has to report the cause of the failure in case of a bad out-
come, deciding blaming intensities and how much evidence to present against
employees. A "court" decides if the employee was the culprit (ec) or if the
superior was the culprit (sc) of the failure.
5) With probability ￿ the superior is replaced by another one, who is com-
petent with a probability ￿.
2.3 Equilibrium De￿nition
In the presence of uncertainty about superior￿ s type, the state variable is just
the probability assigned by "consumers" to the superior being competent (i.e.
the reputation denoted as ￿). A Markov strategy for competents in good times
(G) is a mapping ￿G : [0;1] ! [0;1], where ￿G(￿) is the probability of hiring
an expert when reputation is ￿ 2 [0;1]: Similarly, in bad times (B) the Markov
strategy for competents is a mapping ￿B : [0;1] ! [0;1]. Inepts make no choice,
having then a trivial strategy of hiring nonexperts.8
8As noted in Mailath and Samuelson (2001), by restricting attention to strategies that only
depend on consumers￿posteriors, in equilibrium di⁄erent superiors will behave identically in
identical situations.
7The behavior of "consumers" is described by the Markov belief function
p : [0;1] ! [0;1] where p(￿) is the probability "consumers" assign to receiving a
good outcome, given a reputation ￿ 2 [0;1] (recall utilities from good and bad
results have been normalized to 1).
In a Markov perfect equilibrium superiors maximize revenues, ￿ consumers￿ ￿
expectations are correct and "consumers" use a Bayes￿ rule to update their
posterior probabilities.
Since the state variable is the reputation ￿, the model relies importantly
on the updating of beliefs about the competence of the superior. There are
two rounds of updating that follow a Bayes rule: The update after production
(Pr(Cjg) and Pr(Cjb)) and the potential update ONLY after a bad outcome
(Pr(Cjb;ec) and Pr(Cjb;sc)), which is based on the observation of "court"￿ s
decisions after scapegoating. The following lemmas show explicitly in terms of
parameters and decision rules the updating after the two possible states in each
round. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Beliefs updating after production (￿rst round)
After production (￿rst stage), two updates can occur
a) The production is successful and the outcome is good (g)
Pr(Cjg) =
Pr(gjC)￿
Pr(gjC)￿ + Pr(gjI)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1)
where
Pr(gjC) = ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿G)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿B + ￿(1 ￿ ￿B)]
Pr(gjI) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
b) The production is a failure and the outcome is bad (b)
Pr(Cjb) =
Pr(bjC)￿
Pr(bjC)￿ + Pr(bjI)(1 ￿ ￿)
(2)
where
Pr(bjC) = ￿[￿￿G + ￿(1 ￿ ￿G)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[(1 ￿ ￿)￿B + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿B)]
Pr(bjI) = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
Lemma 2 Beliefs updating after scapegoating (second round ONLY
after a failure in the ￿rst round)
After blaming (nested stage after a failure), two updates can occur














Pr(ecjC;b) = ￿[x￿G + z(1 ￿ ￿G)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[x￿B + z(1 ￿ ￿B)]
Pr(ecjI;b) = y












Pr(scjC;b) = ￿[(1￿x)￿G+(1￿z)(1￿￿G)]+(1￿￿)[(1￿x)￿B +(1￿z)(1￿￿B)]
Pr(scjI;b) = (1 ￿ y)
Corollary 3 In the e¢ cient equilibrium.
a) After production, Pr(Cjg) > Pr(C) > Pr(Cjb) for all ￿ 2 (0;1)
b) After scapegoating:
If x > y, Pr(Cjb;ec) > Pr(Cjb) > Pr(Cjb;sc) for all ￿ 2 (0;1)
If x = y, Pr(Cjb;ec) = Pr(Cjb) = Pr(Cjb;sc) for all ￿ 2 (0;1)
If x < y, Pr(Cjb;ec) < Pr(Cjb) < Pr(Cjb;sc) for all ￿ 2 (0;1)
Proof. In the e¢ cient equilibrium (￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1)
a) From Lemma 1, Pr(Cjg) > Pr(C) > Pr(Cjb) because ￿(1￿￿)+(1￿￿)￿ >
￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿ since ￿ > ￿ by assumption.
b) From Lemma 2, Pr(ecjC;b) = x and Pr(ecjI;b) = y. Depending on the
ordering between x and y, the relations in the Corollary hold.
De￿nition 4 A Markov perfect equilibrium9 is: Probabilities of hiring experts
both in good and bad times (￿G and ￿B), blaming intensities (x, y and z),
probabilities "consumers" assign to receiving a good outcome (p(￿)) given a rep-
utation prior ￿ = Pr(C), and posterior beliefs ’ = Pr(CjS;￿) where S are the
three possible states S 2 fg;(b;ec);(b;sc)g, such that:
9We require behavior to be Markov in order to eliminate equilibriums that depend on
implausible degrees of coordination between the superior behavior and "consumers" belief￿ s
about that superior behavior. (See discussion in Mailath and Samuelson, 1998).
91) Delegation decisions by competent superiors
￿G(￿) (in good times) and ￿B(￿) (in bad times) maximize a value function
V (￿) for all possible reputation values ￿
2) Blaming intensities by superiors
x, y and z maximize the value function V (￿) for all feasible ￿
3) Expected utility (and payments) of "consumers"
Probabilities "consumers" assign to receiving a good outcome given a repu-
tation prior ￿ (i.e. Pro￿ts for the superior)
p(￿) = Pr(gj￿) = Pr(gjC)￿ + Pr(gjI)(1 ￿ ￿) (5)
4) Beliefs about competence (updated using Bayes rule).
a) Update after a good outcome (g)
’(￿jg) = ￿g = (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(Cjg) + ￿￿ (6)




b = (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(Cjb;ec) + ￿￿ (7)




b = (1 ￿ ￿)Pr(Cjb;sc) + ￿￿ (8)
A strategy for superiors uniquely determines the equilibrium up-
dating rule that "consumers" must use if their beliefs are to be cor-
rect.
3 E¢ cient Equilibrium, Ine¢ cient Scapegoating
This paper has a fundamental question. Does scapegoating really reduce the
probability of achieving an e¢ cient outcome?
With this question in mind we focus on the conditions for an e¢ cient situa-
tion to be sustained as an equilibrium10. Considering the assumption (￿￿￿) >
(wE ￿ wN) > 0, e¢ ciency is achieved when competents always hire experts,
10This model has multiple equilibria, including a very ine¢ cient one that may arise without
conditions, in which competents only hire nonexperts. Intuitively, if "consumers" think com-
petents will hire nonexperts they will not update beliefs and competents will optimally prefer
never to hire experts, who are more expensive workers and given beliefs, do not represent any
additional bene￿t in terms of reputation. This is an equilibrium because superior￿ s strategies
uniquely determine the equilibrium updating rule that "consumers" must use if their beliefs
are to be correct.
10regardless of their current reputation or whether times are good or bad (i.e.
￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1, for all feasible ￿).
The condition for this e¢ cient situation to be sustained as an equilibrium is
expressed by a cuto⁄￿, such that di⁄erence in wages wE￿wN has to be smaller
than ￿. This cuto⁄ is obtained both in good and bad times with scapegoating
possibilities (￿S
G and ￿S
B) and without scapegoating possibilities (￿NS
G and
￿NS
B ). The last case is used just as a benchmark to see how results di⁄er when
superiors can impunely blame workers.
As will be shown, whenever x > y and blaming capabilities of competents








These simple inequalities, which are in fact typically strict, summarize the
main conclusions of the paper. Given a wage di⁄erential in the economy, the ￿rst
inequality says that scapegoating makes the condition for an e¢ cient equilibrium
￿ ￿ (wE ￿ wN) > 0 more di¢ cult to hold. Furthermore it will be shown that
￿NS
G = ￿NS
B > 0, which means that without scapegoating it is always possible
to ￿nd a positive wage di⁄erential close enough to zero that sustains e¢ ciency,
which is not necessarily the case under the presence of scapegoating.
The second inequality says that it is even more di¢ cult to achieve e¢ ciency
with scapegoating in bad times than in good times. This will be called "Machi-
avellian E⁄ect", a feature consistent with real examples and, as shown by the
equality in (9), not captured when scapegoating is not considered as a choice.
3.1 Conditions for e¢ cient equilibrium
As a ￿rst step we present the condition for the existence of an e¢ cient equilib-
rium without scapegoating, which is not only easier to interpret but also helps
to build on intuition.
In this case there are only two possible states (g and b) since there is no
blaming activity allowed after a failure (nobody asks why things went wrong!).
The reputation after a bad draw would be ￿b directly (de￿ned similarly to ￿g
in equation (6)). The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 E¢ cient Equilibrium without Scapegoating
Suppose ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿0 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)], ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1) In case
the report about the causes of the failure is not allowed (no "blaming" stage),






￿(1 ￿ ￿)[X + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V f]
o
> 0 (10)
such that, for all ￿NS ￿ (wE ￿ wN) > 0, the e¢ cient pure strategy pro￿le
in which competents always hire experts is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
11where
Vf = Pr(gjDE)Y g+Pr(bjDE)Y b
X = (￿ ￿ ￿)[p(￿g) ￿ p(￿b)]
Yi = (￿ ￿ ￿)[V (￿gi) ￿ V (￿bi)] for i 2 fg;bg
Since our objective is to compare this benchmark with the extended model
that allows for blaming activities, the next proposition presents the conditions
to have an e¢ cient equilibrium when scapegoating is a possibility (people ask
why things went wrong!). The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 E¢ cient Equilibrium with Scapegoating
Suppose ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿0 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)], ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1). In case
the report about the causes of the failure is allowed (scapegoating),
a) If x ￿ y, conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium are exactly the same as
the case without scapegoating (Proposition 5).
b) If x > y, there exists a, non-necessarily positive, cuto⁄ for each state of










such that, for all ￿S
s ￿ (wE ￿ wN) > 0, the e¢ cient pure strategy pro￿le in








XB = (￿ ￿ ￿)p(￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿b;DE) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿b;DN)









b + (1 ￿ z)￿
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and, for i 2 fg;bg
Y B



















A couple of features are worth noting before going to the main proposition of
the paper. First, it￿ s necessary to emphasize that the non-scapegoating case is
just a particular example of the scapegoating case. When x ￿ y both cases are in
fact exactly the same. When x > y, as x, y, z ! 0 (maintaining the relation z ￿
x > y) always ￿b;DN ! ￿b;DE ! ￿b (as can be checked easily from equations (7),
12(8), (12), (13) and Lemma 2). Hence XB ! XG ! X = (￿￿￿)[p(￿g)￿p(￿b)],
and V B
f ! V G
f ! Vf. This is the same as saying that cuto⁄s in all situations
approach each other (￿S
B ! ￿S
G ! ￿NS), or that Proposition 6 approaches
Proposition 5, as the importance of blaming disappears.
Second, in the di⁄ering case (x > y), since (wE ￿ wN) is positive by as-
sumption and there is no way to know the sign of ￿S
s , it can only be said that
whenever ￿S
s < 0, no wage di⁄erential (wE ￿wN) can possibly support an e¢ -
cient equilibrium. Even when in the absence of scapegoating there is always a
positive wage di⁄erential that supports an e¢ cient equilibrium, this is not neces-
sarily true under scapegoating possibilities. This naturally goes in the proposed
direction that scapegoating is harmful for e¢ ciency, which will be formalized in
the next subsections.
In the remainder of the paper, and unless stated otherwise, when referring to
the scapegoating case we will be referring speci￿cally to the case where x > y,
the only interesting situation in which scapegoats constitutes a problem.
3.2 Scapegoating Ine¢ ciency
Next, the most important conclusion of the paper, the negative impact of scape-
goating on the probability to sustain e¢ ciency, is derived. The strategy is to
prove that conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium with scapegoating when x > y
(from Proposition 6) are more di¢ cult to hold than without scapegoating (from
Proposition 5).
Proposition 7 Scapegoating Ine¢ ciency
Suppose ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿0 2 [￿￿;1￿￿(1￿￿)], ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿ 2 (0;1) and competents
have better blaming capabilities than inepts (x > y). It is always possible to ￿nd
a z ￿ z￿ = 1 ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ x) such that the range of wage di⁄erentials wE ￿ wN > 0
that supports an e¢ cient situation is smaller with scapegoating than without it.
Proof. We need to prove that ￿NS ￿ ￿S
G for all ￿ 2 (0;1). This is enough
since in the "Machiavellian E⁄ect" Theorem (Proposition 10) ahead it will be
shown that always ￿S
G ￿ ￿S
B. This proof is based on the simpler case in which
scapegoating is not a possibility in the future, only in the current period. The
conclusion for the more general case does not varies but it is characterized by
awkward statements (shown in the Appendix). We consider only the relevant
case in which x > y and there is a separating blaming equilibrium such that
￿
ec
b > ￿b > ￿
sc
b
We will proceed in three steps. First we will show that ￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE,
second that ￿b;DE ￿ ￿b (as de￿ned in Proposition 6) and ￿nally that ￿NS ￿ ￿S
G
by proving that X + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Vf ￿ XG + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V G
f for all feasible ￿.
13Step 1: (￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE)
Consider beliefs about decision rules in the e¢ cient equilibrium (￿G(￿) =
￿B(￿) = 1), from (13), (7) and (8),
￿b;DN = z￿
ec











b + y(1 ￿ ￿
pb
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and,from (12), (7) and (8),
￿b;DE = x￿
ec











b + y(1 ￿ ￿
pb
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b = Pr(Cjb), as de￿ned in Lemma 1 and 211.
Subtracting both expressions.
￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
pb
b (1 ￿ ￿
pb
b )(z ￿ x)(x ￿ y)
y(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)[1 ￿ 2y ￿ ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]
(14)
which cannot be negative since z ￿ x > y and ￿
pb
b 2 [0;1].
Step 2: (￿b;DE ￿ ￿b)
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￿b;DE ￿ ￿b =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
pb
b (1 ￿ ￿
pb
b )2(x ￿ y)2
y(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)[1 ￿ 2y ￿ ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]
(15)
which cannot be negative since ￿
pb
b 2 [0;1].
Step 3: (￿NS ￿ ￿S
G for all ￿ 2 (0;1))
Given equations (10) and (11), it￿ s su¢ cient to show the following two claims.
Claim 1) X ￿ XG for all ￿.
Subtracting these expressions
X ￿ XG = ￿[p(￿b;DN) ￿ p(￿b)] ￿ ￿[p(￿b;DE) ￿ p(￿b)]
11Recall ￿
pb
b = Pr(Cjb) represents the standard Bayes updating after a bad outcome and
before any blaming activity, (superscrip pb denotes "pre blaming"). This is an update not
adjusted by ￿ because it happens before the period ends and a replacement occurs.
14which is non-negative since ￿ > ￿ by assumption and p(￿b;DN) ￿ p(￿b;DE) for
all feasible ￿ by step 1 (equation 14) and monotonicity of p(￿).
Claim 2) Vf ￿ V G
f for all ￿.
Subtracting these expressions
Vf ￿ V G
f = Pr(gjDE)[Y g￿Y G
g ] + Pr(bjDE)[Y
b￿Y G
b ]
is non-negative if, for i 2 fg;bg
Yi￿Y G
i =(￿z ￿ ￿x)[V (￿
ec
bi) ￿ V (￿
sc




Because of the monotonicity of V (￿) in ￿ and since, by equation (7) and
Corollary 3, ￿
ec
b ￿ ￿b, then V (￿
ec
bi) ￿ V (￿bi). A su¢ cient condition for non-
negativity is then (￿z ￿ ￿x) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿). This condition is ful￿lled whenever,
z ￿ z￿ = 1 ￿
￿
￿
(1 ￿ x) (16)
where
￿
￿ is a measure of the relative capability of experts to achieve good
production results when compared to nonexperts.
Hence, whenever the su¢ cient condition z ￿ z￿ holds, regardless of the
value function￿ s behavior, the likelihood of having an e¢ cient situation is the
highest without scapegoating or, which is the same in this model, when the
credibility assigned to evidence presented by superiors against subordinates is
low in general.
The intuition behind this general result is that reports after a failure when
x > y represent a way for competents to further signal their competence. If
this is the case, competents can exploit di⁄erences in the blaming capacity as
an additional channel to distinguish themselves from inepts.
This can be done in two ways. First by the di⁄erence between competents
and inepts in maximum blaming capabilities (x ￿ y), which reduces reputation
losses after bad results. Second, by the assumed di⁄erence between blaming ex-
perts and nonexperts (z￿x), which may introduce an additional gain from hiring
nonexperts (additional to the lower cost that wN represents), by increasing the
probability that the "court" assigns the fault of the failure to the employee.
Now, it is important to put into context the su¢ cient condition for the
ine¢ ciency of scapegoating, z ￿ z￿. This is relevant because we do not know
the behavior of the value function. But, for example, if the value function
were linear, both Yg and Yb would behave exactly as X and scapegoating would
always imply ine¢ ciency, regardless of the speci￿c value of z.
As can be seen z￿ depends on
￿
￿, a measure of the relative capability of
experts to achieve good outcomes in production when compared to nonexperts.
For example, if hiring experts almost guarantees success in good times (￿ ! 0),
then z￿ ! 1. At the other side, if hiring experts does not add a lot to the
probability of success (￿ ! ￿), then z￿ ! x.
15This implies that the su¢ cient condition z ￿ z￿ is more di¢ cult to hold when
hiring experts is really bene￿cial from a productive point of view, which means
superiors can signal their competence directly in the ￿rst stage, without the
need to go to "court". On the other hand, when hiring experts does not make
an important di⁄erence in production, competents tend to rely more on the use
of scapegoating to signal competence, leading heavily towards ine¢ ciency.
Conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium in the three cases discussed previ-
ously, without scapegoating (both in good and bad times, given by ￿NS), with
scapegoating in good times (given by ￿S
G ) and with scapegoating in bad times
(given by ￿S
B ) can be easily seen in Figure 1. In this case we assumed that
Vf = V G
f = V B
f = 0, which easy computations conservatively biasing results
in favor of hiring experts. Even in this conservative situation, not allowing for
scapegoating (not asking why things went wrong!) increases the incentives to
e¢ ciently hire experts.12.
Figure 1
Example of conditions for E¢ cient Equilibrium
Benefits
Costs
1 lq=0.06 1-l(1-q)=0.96 f (Reputation)
d(1-l)X=Diff. benefits from experts
NO SCAPEGOATING
GOOD AND BAD TIMES
d(1-l)X











S = - 0.072
12Parameters used: ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 0:6, ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:1, ￿ = 0:4, ￿ = 0:5, y = 0:15,
x = 0:3 and z = 0:85. The su¢ cient condition from equation (16) holds because in this case
z > z￿ = 0:825
163.3 The intuition lying behind scapegoating ine¢ ciency
The whole action in previous theorems and proofs comes from the comparison
of reputation competents expect to obtain from hiring experts as opposed to
hiring nonexperts.
Without scapegoating, the reputation conditional on the ￿rst round￿ s results
(i.e. conditional on good and bad outcomes) is known and given by ￿g after
a success (as de￿ned in equation (6)) and ￿b after a failure (de￿ned also in a
similar way than (6) but using equation (2) instead).
With scapegoating, while the expected reputation after a good outcome is
also independent of the hiring decision, ￿g (because there is no second stage
after a success), the expected reputation after bad results depends on the hiring
decision. It matters for blaming whether the superior works with an expert or
with a nonexpert since experts are harder to be blamed successfully.
For example, the expected reputation after a failure when hiring experts is
given by,
E(Pr(Cjb)jDE) = ￿b;DE = Pr(ecjDE)’(￿jb;ec) + Pr(scjDE)’(￿jb;sc)
which is the expression in equation (12). Similarly, the expected reputation
after a failure when hiring nonexperts, ￿b;DN, was de￿ned in equation (13).
The di⁄erential gains in reputation expected from good results in production
can be seen as a measure of the incentives to hire experts, since this decision
increases the probabilities of success. These gains can be represented by (￿g ￿
￿b) without scapegoating (regardless of the hiring decision), by (￿g ￿ ￿b;DE)
with scapegoating if the decision is to hire experts and by (￿g ￿ ￿b;DN) with
scapegoating if the decision is to hire nonexperts.
Hence, to understand how incentives to e¢ ciently hire experts behave we
need to understand how ￿b;DN, ￿b;DE and ￿b relate to each other.
As was shown in steps 1 and 2 of Proposition 7￿ s proof, there is a clear
ordering between these expressions when z > x > y.13.
￿g > ￿b;DN > ￿b;DE > ￿b (17)
Graphically, Figure 2 shows the updated reputation value for each case and
each possible reputation prior ￿.
13For this comparison, do not consider extreme cases for z , x and y. This is because ￿g
may be even smaller than ￿b;DE. These cases will be discussed later and do not change, just
reinforce, the results.
17Figure 2
Expected reputation after the ￿rst round










It is easy to check from the equation for each case (Lemmas 1 and 2 and
equations (14) and (15)) that all possible beliefs￿updates are equal when ￿ is
either zero or one. If the prior is ￿ = 0, the update in all cases is ￿￿. If the prior
is ￿ = 1, the update is 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿). For all other values ￿ 2 (0;1), reputation
updates have the ordering shown by relation (17) and Figure 2.
Going back to equations (14) and (15), while the di⁄erence (￿b;DE ￿￿b) can
be interpreted as the reduction in the incentives to hire experts, the di⁄erence
(￿b;DN ￿￿b;DE) can be seen as the increase in the incentives to hire nonexperts.
While the expression (x ￿ y) in the numerator of equations (14) and (15)
shows the magnitude of reputation maintenance due to scapegoating, the ex-
pression (z￿x) on the numerator of equation (14) shows the additional bene￿ts
from hiring nonexperts by taking advantage of the chances to blame them af-
ter a failure. When compared to the case in which blaming is not an option,
scapegoating reduces the incentives to hire experts by the gap (￿b;DE ￿￿b) and
increases the incentives to hire nonexperts by the gap (￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE).
Not only is the ordering clear for all ￿ 2 (0;1) but also the impact of blaming
capacities￿gaps (x ￿ y) and (z ￿ x) on equations (14) and (15). The following
lemmas show that both (￿b;DN ￿￿b;DE) and (￿b;DE ￿￿b), not only are positive
(as shown in steps 1 and 2 in Proposition 7￿ s proof) but also depend positively
on the blaming abilities￿gaps.
18Lemma 8 The di⁄erence between expected reputation after a failure from hiring
experts versus hiring nonexperts (￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE) is non-decreasing in (z ￿ x)
nor in (x ￿ y)
Proof. a) Taking the derivative of expression (￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE) in (14) with






b (1 ￿ ￿
pb
b )(x ￿ y)
y(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)[1 ￿ 2y ￿ ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]2 ￿ 0
b) Taking the derivative of expression (￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE) in (14) with respect






b (1 ￿ ￿
pb
b )(z ￿ x)[y(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)2]
h
y(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)[1 ￿ 2y ￿ ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]2
i2 ￿ 0
The two expressions are strictly positive when z > x > y and ￿
pb
b 2 (0;1).
Lemma 9 The di⁄erence between expected reputation after a failure in cases
with and without scapegoating, (￿b;DE ￿ ￿b) is non-decreasing in (x ￿ y)
Proof. For this proof just consider the di⁄erence ￿b;DE ￿ ￿b in (15) since, as
shown in Lemma 8,
@[￿b;DN￿￿b;DE]
@(x￿y) ￿ 0. Taking derivatives of (￿b;DE ￿￿b) with






b (1 ￿ ￿
pb
b )2(x ￿ y)[2y(1 ￿ y) + (1 ￿ 2y)￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]
h
y[(1 ￿ y) + ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)[1 ￿ 2y ￿ ￿
pb
b (x ￿ y)]2
i2 ￿ 0
which is non-negative because in the numerator, (1￿y) ￿ (x￿y) ￿ ￿
pb
b (x￿y).
This is also strictly positive whenever z > x > y and ￿
pb
b 2 (0;1).
The di⁄erence in the blaming abilities between competents and inepts (x￿y)
basically measures the drop in expected reputation that, thanks to scapegoating,
does NOT occur after a failure. Hence, an increase in (x ￿ y) not only reduces
the incentives to hire experts (by increasing ￿b;DE ￿ ￿b) but also makes more
bene￿cial to hire nonexperts (by increasing ￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE as well).
Similarly, the di⁄erence in the abilities between blaming experts and nonex-
perts (z￿x) measures the greater probability of having a positive "court" deci-
sion against employees if hiring nonexperts. Hence an increase in (z ￿x) makes
even more bene￿cial to hire nonexperts (by further increasing ￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE).
193.4 Machiavellian E⁄ect
The next proposition shows that in bad times an e¢ cient outcome is more
di¢ cult to obtain than in good times. Reputation concerns and scapegoating
rationalize this "Machiavellian E⁄ect" since in bad times superiors are more
worried about potential reputation losses rather than potential reputation gains.
Proposition 10 "Machiavellian E⁄ect"
Suppose ￿ 2 (0;1), ￿0 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)], ￿ 2 (0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1), blaming
reports are allowed and competents have better blaming capabilities than inepts
(x > y). If there exist some wE ￿ wN > 0 such that competents decide to hire
experts in bad times, then they also decide to hire experts in good times, while
the contrary is not necessarily true.
Proof. In order to prove how blaming makes conditions for e¢ cient equilibrium
more di¢ cult to ful￿ll in bad times than in good times we need to show that
￿S
G ￿ ￿S
B by proving XG + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V G
f ￿ XB + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V B
f for all ￿ 2 (0;1).
Considering equation (11) it su¢ ces to show the following two claims,
Claim 1) XG ￿ XB for all ￿:
Subtracting these expressions
XG ￿ XB = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)[p(￿b;DN) ￿ p(￿b;DE)]
which is non-negative since ￿+￿ < 1 by assumption; p(￿) is monotonic in ￿ and
by equation (14) ￿b;DN ￿ ￿b;DE in the separating blaming equilibrium where
x > y and z ￿ x:
Claim 2) V G
f ￿ V B
f for all ￿
Subtracting these expressions
V G
f ￿ V B
f = Pr(gjDE)[Y G
g ￿ Y B
g ] + Pr(bjDE)[Y G
b ￿ Y B
b ]
which is non-negative because Y G






for i 2 fg;bg. This is because ￿ + ￿ < 1 and z ￿ x by assumption, V (￿) is




b by Corollary 3 and separating equilibrium (x > y).
Assuming scapegoating both now and in the future the conclusion and proof
are exactly the same.
Hence, in good times experts are hired for a wider range of wage di⁄erentials
(wE ￿ wN) than in bad times. This does not imply a positive cuto⁄ ￿S
s , but
it does imply it is more likely to have ￿S
G > 0 rather than ￿S
B > 0 and then,
that e¢ ciency be achieved in good times but not in bad times. This is what we
called "Machiavellian E⁄ect".
The intuition behind the "Machiavellian E⁄ect" is that, even when in good
and bad times di⁄erences in probabilities to obtain a good outcome (￿￿￿) are
20the same14, the probability of having a bad outcome is greater in bad times
than in good times (in our model, greater than half). Under the presence of
scapegoating this is important because of the possibility to avoid a big reduction
in reputation if a failure in fact occurs, hence making more attractive the hiring
of nonexperts who can be blamed easily.
3.5 Discussion of results
The relevance of the blaming report for e¢ ciency resides both in its value to
competents to further signal their competence and in its unproductiveness to
"consumers". Since by assumption superiors only care about reputation, de-
cisions will react more to activities that allow a better competence signaling.
If those activities only occur after particular situations, such as scapegoating
only happens after failures, superiors will make decisions trying to achieve those
circumstances, even when detrimental to activities that really matter to society.
To put the results into context, as is generally the case, it is useful to refer
to extreme cases. Assume for a second y = 0 and x = z = 1. This means in-
epts cannot convince anybody about the blame of employees while competents
can always blame others convincingly in front of a "court". In this situation, if
"consumers" see that after a failure the "court" decides against subordinates,
they learn for sure the superior is competent, increasing immediately the repu-
tation. Hence blaming is better than production for competents to signal their
competence. In fact they will prefer to have a failure in order to show their
capabilities more e⁄ectively through "court" rather than through production
performance, a possibility clearly not allowed after a success.
In this very extreme example, competents will never hire experts because
nonexperts are not only less expensive but also increase the probability of going
to "court". That￿ s why the position of a nested activity in the reputation game
is very important to understand its outcome in terms of e¢ ciency.
Naturally, the previous extreme example is consistent with the case x >
y. But what happens if x ￿ y? As shown formally, in this case blaming is
useless to signal competence and competents will not behave di⁄erently than
without scapegoating. To see it clearly, consider now the other extreme in
which inepts can always blame e⁄ectively (y = 1) while competents have zero
blaming capacity (x = 0). In this case, as in all other cases in which x ￿ y, it
is not credible that inepts will use all their abilities to convince courts about
the employee￿ s fault. Why would inepts like to blame workers so e⁄ectively
if by doing so they just signal their ineptitude? To adjust his blaming e⁄orts
downwards (say not presenting proofs, burning evidence against employees, etc.)
and to be confused with competents seems to be a better strategy. Blaming is
an activity, as are many others, where the success probability can be easily
adjusted downwards (just being lazy) but not upwards.
14This is just an assumption to clarify the "Machiavellian E⁄ect" as much as possible. To
assume otherwise does not change the main conclusion.
21Since inepts always want to be confused with competents, in cases where
they are not worse at blaming than competents (x ￿ y), they can decrease y
until it reaches x by reducing blaming intensities and e⁄orts to collect evidence.
Potentially, competents can always be imitated by inepts, not being an equi-
librium the use of the blaming report to impose a new updating round after
production.
Therefore, only when competents outperform in the blaming activity (x > y),
inepts cannot do anything to achieve competent levels x (In fact, that￿ s exactly
why they are inepts!). Naturally they would like to be confused with competents
but they simply cannot be so good. Contrarily, competents want to separate as
much as possible from inepts (x), who will just do the best they can (y). This
is the situation where scapegoating introduces a real di⁄erence in the model,
leading to ine¢ ciencies.
4 Ways to increase the likelihood of an e¢ cient
equilibrium (without spending more money!).
Up to this point we conclude that scapegoating generates ine¢ ciencies because
of its location after bad results in the nested reputation game. Then, a natural
question arises. What happens with activities nested after successes?
Examples of these kinds of situations can be found in abundance in real life
and, as will be shown, increase the likelihood to reach e¢ ciency when compe-
tents are not only better at producing but also at those nested activities.
4.1 Examples of nested activities after successes
Many activities that ￿t into the characterization of unproductive nested stages
after successes can be found in di⁄erent spheres.
A lot of examples belong to the sporting arena. Typical cases are All-Star
Games, exhibition matches performed by the best players in the respective sport
league. These players are often chosen by a popular vote of fans, and the game,
which mostly occurs at the halfway point of the regular season, is basically
unproductive given there is no gain or loss whether or not the competitors are
victorious. All-Star Games are organized by a huge variety of sport leagues such
as, MLB, NHL, NBA, MLS, NLL, NFL, NASCAR, etc.
Players who participate are those very successful in the respective period and
games, even when unproductive from the league and fans￿standpoint, represent
additional ways in which the best players can further signal their competence in
front of a greater mass of people than the one attending regular season matches.
Another example is the formation of national teams and the organization of
international championships (such as the Soccer World Cup) in almost all exist-
ing sports. Only the best players are chosen to be part of national teams and,
even when the objective is productive, it represents an additional way successful
22players can signal their competence in front of the whole world. Typically play-
ers are not paid to participate in these events but, after their conclusion, the
best ones generally obtain better contracts and are hired by important teams.
Examples of nested activities after successes can be found in some organiza-
tions and corporations as well. In many hierarchies, after a division outperforms
relative to the rest of the organization, additional funds and decision respon-
sibilities are assigned to it. In this way the superiors of those agencies have
alternative ways to signal their competence, even when the new responsibilities
are not necessarily relevant to the normal functioning of the division or to the
goals of the organization.
NFI Research, a global research ￿rm based in New Hampshire, conducted a
survey that shows that more than half the managers prefer to be recognized for a
good job by an "increase in responsibility and opportunities to attend external
events". Chuck Martin, NFI￿ s chairman, wrote in Darwin Magazine: "Busi-
nesspeople are not just looking for the employee-of-the-month parking spot. In
fact, the last things they want are trophies, awards...or even time o⁄". In the
same vein, Kraft Bell in a management report15 stated, "People want to be
empowered to have more involvement and collaboration in decisions".
Additional cases can also be discovered in academic environments. Top
researchers and professors are typically invited to participate in round tables
and plenary sessions at professional meetings. These activities, only opened
to professionals very successful on their ￿elds, can be considered as additional
ways available to distinguished academicians to further signal their competence
in front of their counterparts. In fact this may also be part of the reason
congresses and conferences with contributed sessions exist.
In all these academic cases research constitutes the productive and impor-
tant activity. The following stage (the conference, for example), even when
productive in itself, is also very useful to further signal the competence of the
best.
Another environment where it is possible to ￿nd activities nested after suc-
cesses is show business. Successful actors, actresses, music and movie stars
are invited to participate in TV interviews. Even when not paid, being on fa-
mous TV shows represents additional ways to signal competence by exhibiting
charisma or being funny.
A ￿nal interesting case is the new performance-based scheme that New York
is using to improve schools￿quality in which "head teachers of successful schools
receive cash bonuses worth up to $15,000 (to develop new activities)". Further-
more "The New York scheme...is intended to promote successful sta⁄ and also
to make heads more directly accountable for their performance"16 This NY pol-
icy is a combination of more funds and activities principals can use to signal
their competence after successes and a reduction in scapegoating possibilities
after failures. This integral scheme goes exactly in the direction proposed by
this paper.
15Gartner, G2, August 2003 Report.
16BBC News, Wednesday, 30 May, 2001
234.2 E¢ ciency of nested activities after successes.
The model can be easily reinterpreted and modi￿ed to introduce nested activities
after successes. Assume that instead of an unproductive activity after a failure,
as was the case with scapegoating, the game is characterized by an unproductive
activity nested after successes (think about any of the previous examples). The
structure of probabilities, timing and parameters for the production stage have
the same interpretation as before. Hence, without nested activities, competents
compare the expected reputation gains from improving the chances of getting a
good result in production with the greater costs from hiring experts.
The di⁄erence appears in the second stage. After bad results the game is
over but after good results there is a nested activity, which at the time can
be a success (g;s) or a failure (g;f) (these have basically the same spirit than
(b;ec) and (b;sc) in the original model). Using the same notation as before
we can write Pr(sjC;g;DE) = xg 2 [0;xg] and Pr(fjC;g;DN) = yg 2 [0;yg],
which means some di⁄erences in the capabilities of being successful at the nested
activity may exist17.
For example, if xg > yg, hiring experts not only increases the probability
of being successful at production but also at the additional nested activity.
Superiors may choose the probabilities of being successful at the nested activity
by eventually boycotting the worker e⁄orts and actions. If there is no boycott,
the probability of success will be the maximum (say xg = xg if the employee
is an expert) and a maximum boycott intensity by the superior eliminates the
probability of success in the nested activity (xg = 0). This decision about the
boycotting intensity has the same logic that the decision about the blaming
intensity in the original model with scapegoating.
The equilibrium de￿nition in this environment is the same as before with
the di⁄erence that the three possible updating (in place of equations (6)-(8))
are now ￿b (after a bad outcome), ￿
s
g (after successes both in the ￿rst and
second rounds) and ￿
f
g (after success in production and failure in the nested
unproductive activity).
Therefore, we need to restate Lemma 2 in the following way: After a good
outcome, two updates can occur.












Pr(sjC;g) = ￿[xg￿G + yg(1 ￿ ￿G)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[xg￿B + yg(1 ￿ ￿B)]
17Many of the examples discussed in 4.1 do not need delegation because there is no scape-
goating. In fact, in a better description competents would decide between exerting high or
low e⁄orts while inepts would only be able to exert low e⁄orts.
This alternative environment, even the same in spirit, is di⁄erent in that superiors would need
to choose the e⁄ort level both before the ￿rst and second rounds and pay twice the e⁄ort costs.
Introducing this modi￿cation does not substantially change the main conclusion, though.
24Pr(sjI;g) = yg













Pr(fjI;g) = (1 ￿ yg)
Similarly to Corollary 3 it￿ s straightforward to show that, for all ￿, after the
￿rst round Pr(Cjg) > Pr(C) > Pr(Cjb) and after the potential second round
Pr(Cjg;s) > (<)Pr(Cjg) > (<)Pr(Cjg;f) if xg > (<)yg
As in the scapegoating situation, only when xg > yg (i.e. when hiring experts
increases the probability of success both in production and in nested activities)
may the nested stage generate a new reputation updating and a⁄ect e¢ ciency18.
Therefore, in what follows, unless stated otherwise, we consider only the relevant
case in which xg > yg.
As in equations (14) and (15) it￿ s also possible in this context to de￿ne
expected reputation after good results in case of hiring experts and in case of
hiring nonexperts. Equation (14) could be restated in this environment as,
￿g;DE ￿ ￿g;DN =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
pb
g (1 ￿ ￿
pb
g )(xg ￿ yg)2
yg(1 ￿ yg) + ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)[1 ￿ 2yg ￿ ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)]
> 0 (20)
and equation (15) could be restated as,
￿g;DE ￿ ￿g =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿
pb
g (1 ￿ ￿
pb
g )2(xg ￿ yg)2
yg(1 ￿ yg) + ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)[1 ￿ 2yg ￿ ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)]
> 0 (21)
In this case it￿ s also informative to obtain the di⁄erence ￿g;DN ￿ ￿g
￿g;DN ￿ ￿g = ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿
pb
g )2(1 ￿ ￿
pb
g )(xg ￿ yg)2
yg(1 ￿ yg) + ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)[1 ￿ 2yg ￿ ￿
pb
g (xg ￿ yg)]
< 0 (22)
A clear ordering exists among these expressions when xg > yg (and a sepa-
rating equilibrium in the second stage arises),
￿g;DE > ￿g > ￿g;DN > ￿b (23)
18If xg ￿ yg inepts prefer to boycott the probability of success at the nested activity,
imitating competents in order to be confused with them. In this way inepts would not signal
their own ineptitude (this is the same logic explained in section 3.5).
25such that Figure 3 (similar to Figure 2) can be drawn.
Hence hiring experts increases expected reputation after good results ((21)
is positive) while hiring nonexperts in fact decreases it ((22) is negative). The
￿nal e⁄ect is an increase in gains from hiring experts.
The obvious di⁄erence between nested activities after failures (such as scape-
goating) and the situation explained here is that, while the former reduces the
expected reputation gains from successes (from (￿g ￿ ￿b) to (￿g ￿ ￿b;DE)) and
decreases the incentives to hire experts, the later increases the expected repu-
tation gains from successes (from (￿g ￿ ￿b) to (￿g;DE ￿ ￿b)) and increases the
incentives to e¢ ciently hire experts. Even more, while the former increases the
incentives to hire nonexperts (by (￿b;DN ￿￿b;DE)), the later decreases them (by
(￿g;DE ￿ ￿g;DN)).
Figure 3
Expected reputation after the ￿rst round










While Figure 3 delivers the basic intuition that sustains the e¢ ciency of
nested activities after good results when xg > yg, formal proofs are sketched in
the Appendix (following similar strategies than Propositions 6 and 7￿ s proofs
for the scapegoating case). In this way it is possible to say that whenever the
su¢ cient condition
xg > x￿
g = 1 ￿
￿
￿
(1 ￿ yg) (24)
holds, the unproductive stage after a good outcome will always increase the
likelihood of achieving an e¢ cient equilibrium.
26This condition means that, when experts tend to assure a production success
(￿ ! 0), the production stage is a very powerful way to signal competence and
the nested stage is not important to achieving e¢ ciency. Contrarily, if experts
do not add anything to the probability of being successful at producing (￿ ! ￿),
the ￿rst stage does not allow competents to signal their competence at all, being
the su¢ cient condition just xg > yg and the nested activity a powerful means of
increasing e¢ ciency. Recall that this is the same su¢ cient condition expressed
in (16), with z and x replaced by xg and yg respectively.
The key here is not only to introduce nested stages after good results but
also that those activities be su¢ ciently better performed by competents when
working with experts than by inepts who can only work with nonexperts.
The nested reputation idea is based on the possibility that ￿rst stages, whose
outcome really matters to "consumers", may not be so good for signaling com-
petence in order to justify competents￿e¢ cient decisions. But as long as they
give access to activities that create reputation more certainly, decisions that
seem strange at ￿rst glance may actually make a lot of sense.
Finally, it is very interesting to note the "Machiavellian E⁄ect" persists in
this case as well, meaning there are more incentives to hire experts in good times
than in bad times. The reason is similar to the one proposed in the scapegoating
case, but in this situation the probability of being successful and reaching the
nested activity is, in absolute terms, greater in good times, increasing even more
the incentives to hire experts. The proof is also sketched in the Appendix.
In this section we have shown the importance of nested activities for in￿ u-
encing incentives, to understand superiors￿decisions and to explain e¢ ciency
consequences. In general, the introduction of nested activities after successes
is better than after failures in order to promote e¢ cient decisions. The only
condition is a positive correlation between abilities to be successful, both in the
productive and not so productive nested activities.
Many real life situations can be rationalized from this point of view, which
means it is not only a theoretical curiosity. Furthermore it is possible to think
about very unproductive activities that may be useful to promote e¢ cient results
just by exploiting reputation concerns, without requiring costly incentives or
monetary resources.19
5 Conclusion
Scapegoating is a common behavior in public institutions, ￿rms, sports and
even in the Army. The main problem is not the redistribution e⁄ects unfair
blaming may generate, but the ine¢ ciencies in the performance of organizations
19An extreme but funny example is the following one. Suppose that hiring experts is e¢ cient
but incentives from production are not enough for superiors to do it. Assume also experts
heavily outperform nonexperts at playing chess. A cheap way to achieve e¢ ciency would be
to introduce a chess game right after successes in production !
27it may introduce. In fact, this popular idea has been the main argument for last
decade￿ s reforms designed to assign more responsibility to superiors, reducing
their chances to blame subordinates.
Ine¢ ciencies may arise because superiors are concerned about their reputa-
tion while "consumers" only care about production. Because of the imperfect
information that begets reputation problems, interests are not aligned and su-
periors may not make the decisions preferred by society to achieve the best
possible outcome at the lowest possible cost.
Scapegoating makes it even harder to achieve e¢ ciency because it attenuates
potential losses of reputation after failures, reducing the incentives to make
costly decisions conducive to obtaining good results, such as hiring experts.
Furthermore, scapegoating in fact increases the incentives to hire nonexperts in
order to blame them easily if something goes wrong.
To formalize this idea, we de￿ned scapegoating as a non-productive blam-
ing activity "nested" after a bad result and introduced it as an extension of a
reputation model.
This "nested" activity may represent an additional way for superiors to
signal their competence. Depending on whether production or blaming is a
better reputation builder, incentives to hire e¢ cient workers will be a⁄ected.
If blaming is a more secure way to build reputation, scapegoating reduces the
incentives to hire experts, making the e¢ cient situation more di¢ cult to be
sustained as an equilibrium.
Exploiting this nested reasoning, it may be better to locate activities after
successes rather than after failures. If society only cares about the results in
the ￿rst stage, it can be a good idea to introduce, right after positive results,
activities in which competents outperform inepts. This will give superiors more
incentives to achieve good results in the ￿rst stage in order to obtain the rights
of passing to the next one and signal their competence even better.
Furthermore, the model also delivers an interesting feature observed in re-
ality, named here as "Machiavellian E⁄ect", in which competents tend to hire
experts more in good times than in bad times.
All in all, the model we developed allows one to understand how scapegoat-
ing may lead to ine¢ ciencies (by reducing the possible losses in reputation and
decreasing the incentives to hire experts), what the conditions are for this to
happen (competents should be better blaming subordinates in general than in-
epts) and what the possible policies to deal with it are (not only reduce blaming
possibilities by superiors, as proposed by new public sector reforms￿movements,
but also introducing nested activities after good results, which o⁄er successful
superiors additional opportunities to signal their competence).
Obviously these conclusions should be taken carefully. This model just fo-
cuses on one particular delegation motive, which is reputation, leaving out other
important reasons such as specialization and scale. This is why conclusions are
biased towards the assignment of complete responsibility to superiors. A more
comprehensive model, considering all determinants, would be necessary to ob-
tain the optimal allocation of responsibility and accountability to superiors.
28References
[1] Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini [2004]: "Bureacrats and politicians?" NBER,
Working Paper 10241.
[2] Alesina, A. and G. Tabellini [2005]: "Why do politicians delegate?" NBER,
Working Paper 11531.
[3] Bell, N. and P. Tetlock [1989]: "The intuitive politician and the assign-
ment of blame in organizations". Impression Management in Organizations,
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 105-123.
[4] Bendor, A,; Glazer, A. and T. Hammond [2001]: "Theories of delegation".
Annu. Review of Political Science, 4, 235-69
[5] Cole, H. and P. Kehoe [1996]: "Reputation spillover across relationships:
Reviving reputation models of debt" NBER, Working Paper 5486.
[6] Cripps, M; Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson [2004]: "Imperfect monitoring
and impermanent reputations". Econometrica, 72, 407-432
[7] Cripps, M; Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson [2004]: "Disappearing private
reputations in long-run relationships". mimeo, University of Pennsylvania
[8] Dezso, C. [2004]: "Scapegoating and Firm Reputation". mimeo, NYU.
[9] Douglas, T. [1995]: "Scapegoats: Transferring blame". mimeo, Routledge.
[10] Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine [1989]: "Reputation and equilibrium selection
in games with a single patient player" Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
[11] Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine [1992]: "Maintaining a reputation when
strategies are imperfectly observed" Review of Economic Studies, 59, 561-
579.
[12] Huson, M.; Malatesta, P. and R. Parrino [2004]: "Managerial succession
and ￿rm performance". Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
[13] Kreps, D. and R. Wilson [1982]. "Reputation and Imperfect information".
Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253-279
[14] Martin, J. [1997]: "Changing accountability relations: Politics, consumers
and the market" Public Management Service, OECD.
[15] Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson [1998]: "Your reputation is who you￿ re not,
not who you would like to be" CARESS, WP 98-11, U. of Pennsylvania.
[16] Mailath, G. and L. Samuelson [2001]: "Who wants a good reputation?"
Review of Economic Studies, 68, 415-441.
[17] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts [1982]: "Predation, reputation and entry de-
terrence". Journal of Economic Theory 27, 280-312
29[18] Polidano, C. [1999]: "The bureaucrat who fell under a bus: Ministerial
responsibility, executive agencies and the Derek Lewis A⁄air in Britain".
Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 12,
201-229.
[19] Segendor⁄, B. [2000]: "A Signalling theory of scapegoats". mimeo, Stock-
holm School of Economics.
[20] Winter, E. [2001]: "Scapegoats and optimal allocation of responsibility".
mimeo, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
30Appendix




; for i 2 fg;bg (25)
being Pr(C) = ￿ and Pr(I) = 1 ￿ ￿
Equation (25) can be decomposed to be expressed only in terms of parame-
ters and decision rules
For example, for the case i = g, using the law of total probability
Pr(gjC) = Pr(G)Pr(gjC;G) + Pr(B)Pr(gjC;B)
at the same time, in order to express everything in terms of exogenous prob-
abilities, for example Pr(gjC;G) in the ￿rst term of the previous expression can
also be decomposed in two parts
Pr(gjC;G) = Pr(gjC;G;DE)Pr(DEjG) + Pr(gjC;G;DN)Pr(DNjG)
just replacing by de￿ned probabilities (for example Pr(gjC;G;DE) = 1￿￿)
and by decision rules (for example Pr(DEjG) = ￿G) in all terms, the expressions
in Lemma 1 are obtained.




; for i 2 fe;sg (26)
being Pr(Cjb) = ￿
pb
b as de￿ned in Lemma 1 (the superscript pb holds for
"pre-blaming"). By de￿nition Pr(Ijb) = 1 ￿ ￿
pb
b
Equation (26) can be decomposed to be expressed only in terms of parame-
ters and decision rules
For example, for the case i = ec, using the law of total probability
Pr(ecjC;b) = Pr(G)Pr(ecjC;b;G) + Pr(B)Pr(ecjC;b;B)
at the same time, in order to express everything in terms of exogenous prob-
abilities, for example Pr(ecjC;b;G) in the ￿rst term of the previous expression
can also be decomposed in two parts
Pr(ecjC;b;G) = Pr(ecjC;b;G;DE)Pr(DEjG) + Pr(ecjC;b;G;DN)Pr(DNjG)
Replacing by decision rules (for example Pr(DEjG) = ￿G) and considering,
as an example and just to save notation, the equilibrium case in which always
"consumers" correctly predict blaming intensities (for example Pr(ecjC;b;G;DE) =
x), expressions in Lemma 2 are obtained.
31Proof Proposition 5. Fix ￿ and suppose an e¢ cient situation (i.e., the
competent superior always chooses to hire an expert both in good and bad
times (￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1)). Under results from Corollary 3, given any state
s 2 fB;Gg, for all feasible ￿, ’(’(￿jg)jg) = ￿gg > ￿g > ￿ > ￿b > ￿bb and
￿gi > ￿bi for i 2 fg;bg
If s = B, competent￿ s value function when hiring experts is,
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[Pr(gjDE;B)V (￿g) + Pr(bjDE;B)V (￿b)]
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
The payo⁄ from deviating by hiring a nonexpert and thereafter playing the
equilibrium strategy of hiring experts is
V (￿;DN) = p(￿) ￿ wN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
Thus





X = (￿ ￿ ￿)[p(￿g) ￿ p(￿b)]
Yi = (￿ ￿ ￿)[V (￿gi) ￿ V (￿bi)] for i 2 fg;bg
and Pr(gjDE) = Pr(gjDE;G)Pr(G) + Pr(gjDE;B)Pr(B)
Then
Pr(gjDE) = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
and, in the same vein,
Pr(bjDE) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
Working with the condition V (￿;DE) ￿ V (￿;DN) ￿ 0, it￿ s necessary that
cost di⁄erences (wE ￿ wN) ful￿ll
(wE ￿ wN) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[X + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V f]; for all ￿ 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
where Vf = Pr(gjDE)Yg+Pr(bjDE)Y b
Then we can de￿ne ￿NS
B as the minimum value of the expression ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[X+





￿(1 ￿ ￿)[X + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V f]
o
(27)
If s = G, the result will be exactly the same as it is for s = B in (27). This
is because, given the assumption of being in an e¢ cient situation (￿G(￿) =
32￿B(￿) = 1), ￿g and ￿b do not change and, regardless of the environment situa-
tion, the di⁄erence between probabilities of obtaining a good result and proba-
bilities of obtaining a bad result (￿ ￿ ￿) is by assumption also the same.
Hence, both in good and bad times the condition for competents to hire
experts is the same, being always possible to ￿nd some ￿NS ￿ (wE ￿ wN) > 0
such that ￿NS = ￿NS
G = ￿NS
B and competents delegate to e¢ cient workers for
all priors ￿:
Finally it￿ s necessary to show that ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[X + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V f] is positive for
all ￿ 2 (0;1), such that ￿NS > 0:
Without scapegoating this is always true because,
a) ￿(1 ￿ ￿) > 0 since ￿ > 0 and ￿ < 1:
b) X = (￿ ￿ ￿)[p(￿g) ￿ p(￿b)] > 0 since ￿ > ￿ and p(￿) is monotonically
increasing in ￿ (
@p(￿)
@￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0).20
c) Vf > 0 because Yg> 0 and Yb > 0 since the value function V is monoton-
ically increasing in ￿ as well.21
Hence, ￿NS > 0 for all ￿ 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)].
Proof Proposition 6. This proof proceed in two steps. First we solve for the
optimal blaming intensities (x , y and z) chosen by superiors and consistent with
"consumers" beliefs in equilibrium. Second, considering the results obtained in
the blaming stage, we derive conditions for an e¢ cient equilibrium.
Step 1: Blaming stage equilibrium
The strategy we follow in this part of the proof is: First, consider as given
the "consumers" beliefs about blaming intensities and determine optimal deci-
sions by superiors (both competents (x) and inepts(y))22 that maximize their
utility. Second, considering the optimal blaming intensities, we check if beliefs
are correct and consistent with those strategies.
Blaming decisions are made by superiors knowing their own type, their pre-
vious delegation choices and the state of the nature. For example, in bad times,
when competents hired experts and decide a blaming intensity x, the value
function is,
V (￿;x) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)[xV (￿
ec







b are determined by "consumers"￿ s beliefs about x and y.
20More speci￿cally, as in Mailath and Samuelson (2001), suppose F and G are two distri-
butions describing "consumers" beliefs over the delegation decisions by competents in period
t. If F ￿rst-order stochastically dominates G then superior￿ s revenues in period t under F is
higher than under G.
21Following Mailath and Samuelson (2001), let ft(￿;￿0;t0) be the distribution of "con-
sumer" posteriors ￿ at time t > t0 induced by strategy ￿ given period-t0 posteriors ￿0. Then,
ft(￿;￿0;t0) ￿rst-order stochastically dominates ft(￿;￿0
0;t0) for all t > t0 and ￿0 > ￿0
0. The
same idea is true for the distribution of revenues. Hence, V (￿) is monotonic.
22Recall at this point z is not relevant for "consumers" to update beliefs because we are
focusing only on e¢ cient equilibria in which competents always hire experts (i.e. ￿G(￿) =
￿B(￿) = 1)
33For any deviation from x , say to x0 , we can de￿ne,
V D(x) = V (￿;x0) ￿ V (￿;x) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(x0 ￿ x)[V (￿
ec
b ) ￿ V (￿
sc
b )]
1) Assume "consumers" believe x = y.









b ) = 0, competents are indi⁄erent choosing any x0 2 [0;x]
because, regardless of (x0 ￿ x), always V D(x) = 0.
Similarly, inepts are indi⁄erent choosing any y0 2 [0;y] because, regardless
of (y0 ￿ y), V D(y) = 0.
Hence, "consumers" beliefs x = y are correct and consistent with equilibrium
strategies.
2) Assume "consumers" believe x > y.
By Corollary 3 and equations (7) and (8), ￿
ec





b ) ￿ V (￿
sc
b ) > 0, competents choose x0 = x because it maximizes
V D(x). Similarly, inepts will choose y0 = y because it maximizes V D(y).
Only "consumers" beliefs x = x and y = y will be correct, which are consis-
tent with beliefs x > y solely when x > y.
3) Assume "consumers" believe x < y.
By Corollary 3 and equations (7) and (8), ￿
ec





b ) ￿ V (￿
sc
b ) < 0, competents choose x0 = 0 because it maximizes
V D(x). Similarly, inepts will choose y0 = 0 because it maximizes V D(y).
Only "consumers" beliefs x = 0 and y = 0 will be correct, which is not
consistent with beliefs in which x < y.
Because we are focusing on e¢ cient equilibria, the analysis is done based on
beliefs for x and y but a competent type that deviated in the ￿rst stage hiring
nonexperts will decide any z 2 [0;z] in case 1, z = z in case 2 and z = 0 in case
3, exactly for the same arguments explained before for x.
Case 1 supports multiple pooling equilibria in which no further reputation
update is delivered from the blaming activity. Case 2 is the only separating
equilibrium in which the blaming activity represents an additional reputation
updating, but it is only sustained by the case in which x > y. Case 3 is not an
equilibrium.
Step 2: Delegation stage equilibrium
a) Let x ￿ y
Fix ￿ and suppose an e¢ cient situation (i.e., competents always choose to
hire experts in both states (￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1)).
Consider the case in which s=B, competents￿ s value function when hiring
experts is,
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[Pr(gjDE;B)V (￿g) +
Pr(bjDE;B)[Pr(ecjb;DE)V (￿
ec
b ) + Pr(scjb;DE)V (￿
sc
b )]]
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)[xV (￿
ec
b ) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
sc
b )]]





b = ￿b, we have
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
The payo⁄ from deviating by delegating to a nonexpert and thereafter play-
ing the equilibrium strategy of hiring experts is
V (￿;DN) = p(￿) ￿ wN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
These are exactly the same expressions compared to obtain conditions for
an equilibrium without scapegoating in Proposition 5￿ s proof. The same is true
when s=G. Hence, when x ￿ y the existence of scapegoating does not change
e¢ ciency conditions.
b) Let x > y
Even when pooling equilibria in blaming intensities that do not a⁄ect con-
ditions for e¢ ciency also exist in this situation, in what follows we discuss the
unique separating equilibrium in which x = x , y = y and z = z such that
￿
ec
b > ￿b > ￿
sc
b .
Fix ￿ and suppose an e¢ cient situation (i.e. competents always choose to
hire experts in both states ( ￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1)). Under results from Corollary
3, given any state s 2 fB;Gg, for all feasible ￿, ’(’(￿jg)jg) = ￿gg > ￿g > ￿ >
￿b > ￿bb and ￿gi > ￿b1i > ￿bi > ￿b2i for i 2 fg;b1;b2g, calling, just to save
notation, the states after a report b1 = (b;ec) and b2 = (b;sc).
If s = B, competent￿ s value function when hiring experts is,
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[Pr(gjDE;B)V (￿g) +
Pr(bjDE;B)[Pr(ecjb;DE)V (￿
ec
b ) + Pr(scjb;DE)V (￿
sc
b )]]
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)[xV (￿
ec
b ) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
sc
b )]]
The payo⁄ from deviating by delegating to a nonexpert and thereafter play-
ing the equilibrium strategy of hiring experts is
V (￿;DN) = p(￿) ￿ wN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿V (￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)[zV (￿
ec











b1 + (1￿x)Y B
b2 ]g
where
XB = (￿ ￿ ￿)p(￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)[xp(￿
ec









i = (￿ ￿ ￿)V (￿gi) + (1 ￿ ￿)[xV (￿
ec
bi) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
sc
bi)]
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[zV (￿
ec
bi) + (1 ￿ z)V (￿
sc
bi)]
for i 2 fg;b1;b2g
and, as in the previous proof,
Pr(gjDE) = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
and
Pr(bjDE) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
At this point it is important to express XB in terms of expected reputation
after the hiring decision.
Just to save notation, rewrite equation (5) p(￿) = Pr(gjC)￿+Pr(gjI)(1￿￿)












b + C(1 ￿ ￿
ec
b )] + (1 ￿ z)[A￿
sc














b + (1 ￿ z)￿
sc
b ] + C[z(1 ￿ ￿
ec












b + (1 ￿ z)￿
sc
b (29)
In plain words, these expressions represent the expected reputation compe-
tents expect to obtain after a bad result in case of hiring experts (￿b;DE) or
nonexperts (￿b;DN)
From the second term of the long expression and from equation (28),
A￿b;DE + C(1 ￿ ￿b;DE) = p(￿b;DE)
and from the last term and from equation (29)
A￿b;DN + C(1 ￿ ￿b;DN) = p(￿b;DN)
Hence,
XB = (￿ ￿ ￿)p(￿g) + (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿b;DE) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿b;DN)
It￿ s not possible to do the same for Y B
i because we do not know the form
of the value functions just their monotonicity in ￿, (recall we are not assuming
linearity of V (￿)).
An equilibrium in which competents only hire experts when s = B requires
that V (￿;DE) ￿ V (￿;DN) ￿ 0 for all feasible reputation measures ￿. A nec-
essary condition for this to happen is that cost di⁄erences (wE ￿ wN) ful￿ll
(wE ￿ wN) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XB + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
B





b1 + (1￿x)Y B
b2 ]
Then we can de￿ne ￿S
B as the minimum value of the expression ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XB+
￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
B










To save notation it is possible to assume a case in which the future does not
present scapegoating possibilities, so there is just one current shot blaming. In
this case, from tomorrow on it would be possible to have only two possible





b . This expression is used in Proposition 6.
If s = G, the proof is identical to the previous one but having Pr(gjDE;G) =
(1 ￿ ￿) and Pr(gjDN;G) = (1 ￿ ￿).
Then,
XG = (￿ ￿ ￿)p(￿g) + ￿p(￿b;DE) ￿ ￿p(￿b;DN)
and
Y G









for i 2 fg;b1;b2g
Hence the condition for competents to hire experts and to achieve the e¢ -
cient outcome as an equilibrium is,
(wE ￿ wN) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XG + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
G





b1 + (1￿x)Y G
b2 ]
Then we can de￿ne ￿S
G as the minimum value of the expression ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XG+
￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
G










As in the previous case, to save notation it is possible to assume a case in
which the future does not present scapegoating chances and restrict the states





b in equation (31). This is the expression used in
Proposition 6.
Extension proof Proposition 7. Considering the existence of blaming
activities in current and future periods, the only di⁄erence arises in the de￿nition
of V G
f as shown in the previous proof, after equation (31)
Hence we need to prove Vf ￿ V G





b1 + (1￿x)Y G
b2 ]
37Then,
Vf ￿ V G
f = Pr(gjDE)[Y g￿Y G
g ] + Pr(bjDE)[Y
b￿xY G
b1 ￿ (1￿x)Y G
b2 ]
This expression will be non-negative whenever
Yg￿Y G
g ￿ 0 and Yb￿xY G
b1 ￿ (1￿x)Y G
b2 ￿ 0
Proof of Proposition 7 in the main text shows that, Yg￿Y G
g ￿ 0
Now,
Yb ￿ xY G
b1 ￿ (1 ￿ x)Y G
b2 = (￿ ￿ ￿)[V (￿gb) ￿ V (￿bb)]
￿x
￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)V (￿gb1) + ￿[xV (￿
ec
bb1) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
sc
bb1)] ￿ ￿[zV (￿
ec






(￿ ￿ ￿)V (￿gb2) + ￿[xV (￿
ec
bb2) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
sc
bb2)] ￿ ￿[zV (￿
ec




with some algebra Yb￿xY G
b1 ￿ (1￿x)Y G
b2 can be decomposed in two su¢ cient




xV (￿gb) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿gb)
￿
￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
xV (￿gb1) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿gb2)
￿
or, which is the same,
x ￿
V (￿gb) ￿ V (￿gb2)
V (￿gb1) ￿ V (￿gb2)
￿ 1




(￿z ￿ ￿x)[V (￿
ec
bb1) ￿ V (￿
sc







(￿z ￿ ￿x)[V (￿
ec
bb2) ￿ V (￿
sc





which can be reduced to
(￿z ￿ ￿x)[xV (￿
ec
bb1) + (1 ￿ x)V (￿
ec
bb2)] ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)V (￿bb)
The su¢ cient conditions for this to hold are
x ￿





bb1) ￿ V (￿
ec
bb2)
and the condition already obtained in (16).





Equilibrium with nested activities after successes
(similar proof Proposition 6)
Proof. This follows closely the logic and proof￿ s strategies for Proposition 6.
Step 1: Nested stage equilibrium
Here we focus on the e¢ cient equilibrium in which competents hire experts.
For example, in bad times, when competents hired experts and decide a
boycotting intensity xg, the value function is,
V (￿;xg) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿[xgV (￿
s
g) + (1 ￿ xg)V (￿
f





g are determined by "consumers"￿ s beliefs about xg and yg.
For any deviation from xg, say to x0
g, we can de￿ne,
V D(xg) = V (￿;x0
g) ￿ V (￿;xg) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(x0
g ￿ xg)[V (￿
s
g) ￿ V (￿
f
g)]
1) Assume "consumers" believe xg = yg.









g) = 0, competents are indi⁄erent choosing any x0
g 2 [0;xg]
because, regardless of (x0
g ￿ xg), always V D(xg) = 0. Similarly, inepts are
indi⁄erent choosing any y0
g 2 [0;yg] because, regardless of (y0
g￿yg), V D(yg) = 0.
Hence, "consumers" beliefs xg = yg are correct and consistent with equilib-
rium strategies.
2) Assume "consumers" believe xg > yg.
By equations (18) and (19), ￿
s




g = xg and inepts y0
g = yg. Only "consumers" beliefs
xg = xg and yg = yg will be correct, which are consistent with beliefs xg > yg
solely when xg > yg. This means superiors in this case choose a nil boycotting
intensity.
3) Assume "consumers" believe xg < yg.
By equations (18) and (19), ￿
s




g = 0 and inepts y0
g = 0. Only "consumers" beliefs
xg = yg = 0 will be correct, not consistent with beliefs in which xg < yg.
Step 2: Delegation stage equilibrium
a) Let xg ￿ yg
In this situation only a pooling equilibrium exists at the nested stage. Hence,
no further updating exists after production and the existence of nested activities
after successes does not change e¢ ciency conditions.
39b) Let xg > yg
Even when pooling equilibria in boycotting intensities that do not a⁄ect
conditions for e¢ ciency also exist in this situation, in what follows we discuss





g since xg = xg and yg = yg.
Fix ￿ and suppose an e¢ cient situation (i.e. competents always choose to
hire experts in both states ( ￿G(￿) = ￿B(￿) = 1)).
If s = B, competent￿ s value function when hiring experts is,
V (￿;DE) = p(￿) ￿ wE + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿[xgV (￿
s
g) + (1 ￿ xg)V (￿
f
g)] + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
The payo⁄ from deviating by delegating to a nonexpert and thereafter play-
ing the equilibrium strategy of hiring experts is
V (￿;DN) = p(￿) ￿ wN + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[￿[ygV (￿
s
g) + (1 ￿ yg)V (￿
f
g)] + (1 ￿ ￿)V (￿b)]
Then






























for i 2 fg1;g2;bg. (To save notation g1 = (g;s) and g2 = (g;f)).
and, as in previous proofs,
Pr(gjDE) = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
Pr(bjDE) = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)
A necessary condition for an e¢ cient equilibrium is that cost di⁄erences
(wE ￿ wN) ful￿ll
(wE ￿ wN) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XBS + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
BS
f ]; for all ￿ 2 [￿￿;1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
where V BS
f = Pr(gjDE)[xgY BS
g1 + (1￿xg)Y BS
g2 ] + Pr(bjDE)Y BS
b
40Then, we can de￿ne ￿SS
B as the minimum value of the expression ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[XBS+
￿(1 ￿ ￿)V
BS










To save notation it is possible to assume a case in which the future does not
present nested activities. In this case from tomorrow on it would be possible to
have only two states i 2 fg;bg. It￿ s straightforward to check that equation (32)





If s = G, the proof is identical to the previous one, but having Pr(gjDE;G) =
(1 ￿ ￿) and Pr(gjDN;G) = (1 ￿ ￿).
Then,
XGS = (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿g;DE) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p(￿g;DN) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)p(￿b)
and
Y GS









for i 2 fg1;g2;bg
Hence the condition for competents to hire experts and to achieve the e¢ -
cient situation is,










f = Pr(gjDE)[xgY GS
g1 + (1￿xg)Y GS
g2 ] + Pr(bjDE)Y GS





b in equation (33) if in the future only states i 2
fg;bg are possible.
E¢ ciency of nested activities after successes
(similar proof Proposition 7)
Proof. This follows closely the logic in the proof of Proposition 7. Here we will
show nested activities after successes promote e¢ ciency, as opposed to the case
with scapegoating (nested activity after failures).
As shown in the text by equations (20)-(23), ￿g;DE > ￿g > ￿g;DN > ￿b:
We have to show ￿SS
B ￿ ￿NS, because we will show later that ￿SS
G ￿ ￿SS
B .
It￿ s enough to prove the following two claims.
Claim 1) XBS ￿ X for all ￿.
XBS ￿ X = ￿[p(￿g;DE) ￿ p(￿g)] ￿ ￿[p(￿g;DN) ￿ p(￿g)]
which is non-negative since ￿ > ￿ by assumption and ￿g;DE ￿ ￿g;DN.
Claim 2) V BS
f ￿ Vf for all ￿.
V BS
f ￿ Vf = Pr(gjDE)[Y B




i ￿ Yi = (￿xg ￿ ￿yg)[V (￿
s
gi) ￿ V (￿
f
gi)] ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)[V (￿gi) ￿ V (￿
f
gi)]
for i 2 fg;bg. It is non-negative when (￿xg ￿￿yg) ￿ (￿￿￿) since ￿
s
gi ￿ ￿gi.
Then the su¢ cient condition for non negativity is
xg ￿ x￿




Machiavellian E⁄ect with nested activities after successes
(similar proof Proposition 10)
Proof. This follows closely the logic in the proof of Proposition 10.
As shown in the text by equations (20)-(23), ￿g;DE > ￿g > ￿g;DN > ￿b:
We have to show ￿SS
G ￿ ￿SS
B for a "Machiavellian E⁄ect" to exist. It￿ s
enough to prove the following two claims.
Claim 1) XGS ￿ XBS for all ￿.
XGS ￿ XBS = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)[p(￿g;DE) ￿ p(￿g;DN)]
which is non-negative since ￿ + ￿ < 1 by assumption and ￿g;DE ￿ ￿g;DN
Claim 2) V GS
f ￿ V BS
f for all ￿
V GS
f ￿ V BS
f = Pr(gjDE)[Y GS
g ￿ Y BS
g ] + Pr(bjDE)[Y GS
b ￿ Y BS
b ]
which is non-negative because
Y GS
i ￿ Y BS
i = (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(xg ￿ yg)[V (￿
s
gi) ￿ V (￿
f
gi)] ￿ 0
for i 2 fg;bg since ￿ + ￿ < 1 by assumption and ￿
s
gi ￿ ￿
f
gi.
42